Saltar al contenido
Due Diligence Spain · France · Germany 2022 to 2026

4 of our last 8 Due Diligences were in the energy sector. Here's what's happening.

Over six months, Letsfinance executed four Due Diligences on energy companies across Spain, France and Germany. This paper maps eighteen European private capital transactions in Iberian, French and German energy between 2022 and 2026, and reveals a bifurcation that nobody has documented: while large infrastructure funds pay a premium on high-quality assets, a parallel stream of capital is buying distressed operators at survival valuations.

2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 0 0.5B 1B 2B 3B€ EV · EUR Timeline
Fig. 01 · 18 PE/infra transactions · size ≈ disclosed EV
Key findings

Four data points that redefine the reading of European energy capital.

The market reads each transaction as an isolated event. The data show a systematic pattern of European mid-market capital concentration in Iberian, French and German energy, with a structural bifurcation operating in parallel.

01 18
PE / Infra transactions

Spain, France, Germany and Portugal · 2022-2026. 67% have undisclosed valuations.

02 5/5
Top managers · MAD or PAR

Antin, InfraVia, Asterion, Ardian, Qualitas. Continental European capital.

03 6.8€B
Visible valuation

Six disclosed transactions. The real mid-market operates below that visibility threshold.

04 6months
Observation window

Four Letsfinance Due Diligences across radically different sub-sectors.

Central thesis
European mid-market capital does not chase a single trade: it builds four positions layered on the same macro-theme.
Four sub-sectors · four profiles

The market calls them green energy. Investors treat them as four asset classes.

An institutional pension investor entering Antin Fund V and a family office co-investing in an energy valorisation deal are not buying the same risk. They share the macro-theme, not the return thesis.

Risk × return plane · target IRR by sub-sector
Each dot = 1 transaction · size ≈ EV
IRR objetivo (%) Riesgo (early stage)
Sponsor
Geo
Year
EV
Utility-scale solar
IRR 7-10% · PPA 10–15y
6 transactions · Infra Core
Valorisation / Biomethane
IRR 8-12% · regulated tariff
4 transactions · Core+
Multi-tech developer
IRR 10-15% · pipeline value
4 transactions · Value-add
Floating wind
IRR 15-25% · pre-bankable
0 closed buyouts · Early
The finding nobody is mapping

While Antin pays €866M for Opdenergy, DVC Partners gets 80% of Soltec for €30M.

The Spanish renewable market is not a monolith. Two capital streams are entering simultaneously for opposite reasons: strategic capital paying a premium for quality assets, and distressed capital entering at survival valuations in over-leveraged operators.

Strategic capital · infrastructure fund
€866M
Antin Infrastructure Partners · Opdenergy
Public-to-private of a listed Iberian IPP. Premium over market price. Long-term PPA, gigawatts in operation plus development pipeline. Controlled merchant exposure. Investors: European pension and sovereign funds. Spain · 2024.
Distressed capital · special situations
€30M
DVC Partners · Soltec (80%)
Court-approved restructuring. DVC injects €30M in exchange for 80% of the equity. Implied valuation ≈ €37.5M for a solar tracker manufacturer that had hundreds of millions in revenue at its peak. Thesis: balance-sheet clean-up and pipeline monetisation. Spain · 2025.
28×
The EV multiple gap between the most visible strategic transaction of 2024 and the most visible distressed transaction of 2025. Same market, same sub-sector, same time window. Two radically different pricing logics operating in parallel.
Distressed cascade · Spain 2025 to 2026
Three cases in seven months · cycle signal
Sep 2025 Dec 2025 Jan 2026 Mar 2026 Apr 2026
Sep · 2025
Soltec + DVC Partners
80% equity · €30M
Court-approved debt restructuring. DVC Partners injects €30M. Avoids creditor insolvency proceedings. Listed on the Spanish continuous market.
Jan · 2026
Prodiel
€110M debt under renegotiation
Andalusian renewables company renegotiates €110M of debt. Seville Commercial Court rejects creditor-led insolvency request. Restructuring in progress.
Apr · 2026
Univergy Solar
ICO · CN banking · US insurers
Urgently negotiating a debt solution. Creditor stack: ICO (≈€50M), Chinese bank, US insurers. Structure of guarantees, sureties and project finance leverage.

The key to the contrast: Univergy's stack (ICO, Chinese banking, US insurers) is structurally distinct from the transactions analysed in this paper, which are equity from infrastructure funds with signed PPAs. The burned creditors sized their debt on 2021-2022 spot prices, which fell from approx. €200-250/MWh at the peak to €20-50/MWh during 2024-2025 stretches due to solar overcapacity and grid congestion. Infrastructure funds with long-term PPAs do not carry that exposure.

Discussion · Questions this paper does not close

Rational capital concentration or sector bubble?

Capital enters with logic. But the underlying market has stress points that are not fully priced into the 2022-2025 deal valuations.

Question 01

Does the distressed bifurcation anticipate a consolidation cycle?

Soltec, Prodiel and Univergy are three cases in seven months. If the pattern continues, the rescued assets will be sale candidates for infrastructure funds in 2026-2028. How many more projects are in a similar situation and have yet to surface?

Question 02

Grid bottleneck: the variable that models don't incorporate.

The Spain-France interconnection remains the historical bottleneck for cross-border PPAs. The ENTSO-E 2026-2030 plan may unlock value or confirm that some deals embedded optimistic price assumptions.

Question 03

Regulatory risk: in which direction does the distress wave push?

The 2010-2013 Spanish retroactive cuts are in collective memory. Current cases generate political pressure. Will the regulator step in to stabilise spot prices? Extend price-floor mechanisms?

Question 04

When does the first PE buyout of floating wind in Iberia happen?

The zero-transactions gap in floating wind won't last indefinitely. When the first buyout of an operating floating project happens, it will be a market event comparable to the first secondary LBO in French solar in 2022.

Stress point · Spanish spot price · €/MWh
2022 peaks · 2024-2025 compression
€/MWh PICO 2022 COMPRESIÓN 2024-2025
Stress · A
Spot price fell from approx. €200/MWh (2022 peak) to €20-50/MWh in 2024-2025. Deals with high merchant exposure are vulnerable if PPAs don't cover the full debt period.
Stress · B
EV/MW multiple compression in utility solar since 2022 driven by rising discount rates. The 2024-2025 deals assume rate normalisation that is materialising slower than expected.
Stress · C
European infra dry powder: $86.4Bn in 2025, an all-time high. Creates deployment pressure that can erode pricing discipline when the quality pipeline is limited.
Implications for sell-side

What it means for an energy owner selling today.

The window is open, but it isn't uniform. The right buyer for a solar asset with a PPA is not the same as the right buyer for a multi-technology developer or an energy valorisation project. Positioning without that distinction leaves premium on the table.

01

Sub-sector defines the buyer, not geography.

Antin buys scaled operating portfolios. InfraVia enters tech-niche platforms: biomethane, storage, industrial decarbonisation. Asterion builds and sells Iberian conglomerates. The right process starts by mapping which fund has an active mandate for the specific asset profile.

02

The distressed bifurcation is time pressure, not just risk.

If the distressed consolidation cycle plays out in 2026-2028, it will add restructured assets to the pipeline of active managers. That compresses the premium paid for quality assets as funds gain more options. The premium-pricing window narrows with each distressed transaction.

03

The advisor matters more than ever in this market.

The five most active managers are headquartered in Madrid or Paris with mandates from funds closed in 2022-2025 facing deployment pressure. An advisor with direct access to Antin, InfraVia and Asterion, who understands the difference between a PPA asset and a merchant asset, is today a material valuation differentiator.

Closing

European private capital is redistributing the energy of Spain, France and Germany. The question is which side of the trade your asset is on.

We have executed four financial Due Diligences in this market in six months. In each one, identifying the right buyer was the most critical decision: not all infrastructure funds look at the same assets, pay the same premium, or operate on the same calendar.

The analysis you have read describes the market as it operates today. But the 2027 market will be different: today's distressed assets will have been restructured and will be competing with yours for the same capital. The premium-pricing window is real and has an expiration date. If you are considering a transaction, the M&A sell-side advisory at the right moment makes the difference.

For energy asset owners

If you have a solar, wind or energy valorisation asset in Spain, France or Germany and are considering a transaction within the next 18 months, the choice of advisor determines which fund you reach and on what terms.

For institutional investors

Letsfinance's four Due Diligences in Iberian, French and German energy are proprietary data. The complete dataset of 18 transactions is available for testing your own theses.

Te ayudamos

¿Hablamos de tu caso?

Contacta con nosotros